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Would we be Right to Try 
“Right to Try”? 
José Miola & Bernadette J. Richards† 
Abstract 
In both the United Kingdom and United States of America 
legislation has been proposed or enacted which claims to provide 
patients with a ‘right’ of access to experimental drugs and treatments 
where there is no other hope. In this paper we will explore this narrative 
and consider the steps taken in the United States to shift to a more 
rights driven legal framework. The paper will critically assess the 
United States model and the similarly framed ‘Saatchi’ model in the 
United Kingdom; demonstrating that, despite the rights-based 
narrative, these laws do not represent a significant change in access to 
treatment for patients. Rather, the reality is that this ‘right to try’ 
paradigm represents a patient advocate narrative that is deeply flawed. 
It fails to implement any meaningful change, exposes vulnerable 
patients to risk of harm and, potentially, delays safe development of 
potentially life-saving treatment regimes. 
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Introduction 
The traditional doctor-patient relationship grew out of the 
paternalistic Hippocratic tradition.1 It was an unequal interaction with 
 
†  José Miola, Professor of Law and Chair in Law and Social Justice, School 
of Law, University of Leeds, United Kingdom. Bernadette J. Richards, 
Associate Professor of Law, Adelaide Law School, University of Adelaide, 
Australia. 
1. See, e.g., Edmund D. Pellegrino, Toward an Expanded Medical Ethics: 
The Hippocratic Ethic Revisited, in CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
MEDICAL ETHICS 25 (Robert M. Veatch, ed., 1989); JOSÉ MIOLA, MEDICAL 
ETHICS AND MEDICAL LAW: A SYMBIOTIC RELATIONSHIP 23 (2007). 
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the all-knowing doctor sharing their knowledge and expertise with less-
educated or uninformed patients.2 A patients’ best interests were 
determined wholly by the doctor who was responsible for all clinical 
decisions, and healthcare was something done to the vulnerable patient 
who was a passive participant in the treatment process.3 Gradually over 
time this traditional paradigm has shifted with the patient becoming 
an active participant in the clinical relationship which is now most 
commonly defined as a partnership.4 In some circumstances the 
pendulum has continued to swing through the partnership model to a 
rights-based narrative, with some asserting that the patient voice 
should be stronger, that the existing regulatory control over access to 
emerging treatment is inappropriate and that patients have a right to 
access treatments that would otherwise be withheld from them.5 The 
patients have now shifted from being passive recipients of treatment to 
being characterized as “consumer exercising choice.”6 This exemplifies 
our new, patient-facing medical law. 
This rights-based dialogue has driven the development, and in the 
United States successful introduction, of so-called ‘right to try’ laws.7 
The narrative around these laws is that patients have a right to access 
even unproven drugs and forms of treatment, and that the existing 
 
2. Pellegrino, supra note 1, at 27. See Richard L. Street et al., Beliefs About 
Control in the Physician-patient Relationship, 18(8) J. GEN. INTERN 
MED. 609 (2003). 
3. See MIOLA, supra note 1, at ch. 2. 
4. Such a model is evident in the landmark ruling of the Supreme Court of 
the United Kingdom in Montgomery v. Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] 
UKSC 11, [81] (appeal taken from Scot.). See also Community Research, 
Doctors’ Attitude to Consent and Shared Decision-Making: Full Research 
Report for the GMC 11-13 (2017), https://www.gmc-uk.org/media/
documents/Doctors_attitudes_to_consent_and_shared_decision_
making_ FINAL_research_report.pdf_72137875.pdf. 
5. H. Fernandez Lynch et al., Promoting Patient Interests in Implementing 
the Federal Right to Try Act, 320(9) JAMA 869 (2018). 
6. Indeed, this language of patients’ rights can be said to be the key message 
of the decision in Montgomery. Montgomery UKSC 11, at [75]. See R. 
HEYWOOD & J. MIOLA., The Changing Face of Pre-Operative Medical 
Disclosure: Placing the Patient at the Heart of the Matter, 133 LQR 
296 (2017). But see Jonathan Montgomery, Law and the demoralization 
of medicine, 26 (2) LEGAL STUDIES 185, 187-88 (2006), and Jonathan 
Montgomery & Elsa Montgomery, Montgomery on informed consent: an 
inexpert decision?, 42 J. MED. ETHICS 89, 90-91 (2016). 
7. For the federal version, see Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan 
McLinn and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act 2017, S. 204, 115th Cong. 
(2017). For a full, updated list of states’ laws see Right To Try In Your 
State, GOLDWATER INST., http://righttotry.org/in-your-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/2FPA-2D94]. 
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framework represents an unacceptable denial of hope.8 The focus of 
these laws is therefore on restoring ‘patient rights’ and the assertion 
that the State and regulatory bodies are withholding access, and 
therefore hope, from desperate patients. This represents a significant 
shift from a protectionist model whereby new medical treatments must 
work through carefully constructed stages of testing to ensure that they 
are safe to a demand and supply model (the patient can assert a right 
to take risks that, in the previous, principled approach, the State 
asserted were unacceptable.9 In this paper we will explore this narrative 
and consider the steps taken in the United States to shift to a more 
rights-driven legal framework. The paper will critically assess the 
United States model and the similarly-framed ‘Saatchi’ model in the 
United Kingdom; demonstrating that, despite the rights-based 
narrative, these laws do not represent a significant change in access to 
treatment for patients. Rather, the reality is that this ‘right to try’ 
paradigm represents a patient-advocate narrative that is deeply flawed. 
It fails to implement any meaningful change, exposes vulnerable 
patients to risk of harm and, potentially, delays safe development of 
potentially life-saving treatment regimes. In short, the ‘right to try’ 
movement is inappropriately named and should instead be given the 
far less catchy, but more accurate label: ‘right to ask to try an unproven 
and potentially dangerous form of treatment.’ 
I. What are ‘Right to Try’ Laws? 
Right to try laws are a legislative trend that has swept through 
America. Over 40 states have already passed such laws, with others 
having introduced them into their state legislatures and going through 
the process of doing so.10 8 In addition, a federal right to try law was 
passed in May 2018, and signed into law by President Trump later that 
year, which means that patients in states without the legislation can 
obtain access to its benefits.11 There is insufficient space to consider the 
precise history of right to try laws in the US,12 but it suffices to say 
 
8. See Federal Right To Try: Questions And Answers, GOLDWATER 
INST., https://righttotry.org/rtt-faq/ [https://perma.cc/7T7W-35RB], 
the website created and maintained by the Goldwater Institute, the 
thinktank responsible for creating the initial ‘off the shelf’ legislation. 
9. It should, however, be noted that this is a false narrative. 
See José Miola, Bye Bye Bolitho: The Curious Case of the Medical 
Innovation Bill, 15 J. MED. L. INT. 124 (2015); see also R. Dresser, The 
“Right to Try” Investigational Drugs: Science and Stories in the Access 
Debate, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1631 (2015) (regarding the position in the US). 
10. GOLDWATER INST., supra note 7. 
11. See Lynch et al., supra note 5. 
12. For a history of the Right to Try movement in the United States, see Erin 
Mershon, How the ‘right-to-try’ movement muscled its way into 
Washington, STAT (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/
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that the laws began life as ‘off the shelf’ legislation created by the right 
wing, libertarian think-tank The Goldwater Institute (the Institute).13 
The Institute refers to itself as aiming “to defend and strengthen the 
freedom guaranteed to all Americans . . . [and] a national leader for 
constitutionally limited government.”14 This focus on limiting the role 
of government has led some to argue that the real purpose behind the 
legislation is a desire to weaken the Food and Drug Administration’s 
control over drug licensing, replacing it with a free market system.15 
This is, however, denied by the Institute.16 In any event, right to try 
laws are advertised as solving the problem of a lack of access to 
experimental drugs by patients with terminal illness.17 They claim to 
give hope where previous regulatory regimes actively deny it.18 This is 
made clear on the right to try website: 
 
Right to Try is needed because: 
• Dying people don’t have access to promising treatments once 
clinical trials are over, even if they have been successful 
 
2018/03/07/right-to-try-movement-washington/ 
[https://perma.cc/N344-WU5T]. Also influential was support from the 
Abigail Alliance, an organization set up to lobby in support of the cancer 
sufferer receiving experimental but unlicensed drugs. For a more recent 
consideration of the background to the law and the different imperatives, 
see FOLKERS ET AL., Federal Right to Try: Where is it Going?, 49(2) 
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 26 (2019). 
13. See Do Dying Patients Have a Right to Try Experimental Drugs? 
Libertarians Say Yes, GOLDWATER INST. (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://righttotry.org/do-dying-patients-have-a-right-to-try-experimental
-drugs-libertarians-say-yes/ [https://perma.cc/4H8X-QNAC]. 
14. Jennifer Tiedemann, Patient with Aggressive Brain Cancer Treated under 




15. See Rita Rubin, Experts Critical of America’s Right to Try Drugs 
Laws, 386 LANCET 1325, 1325 (2015); Alison Bateman-House, 
L. Kimberley, B. Redman, N. Dubler & A. Caplan, Right to Try Laws: 
Hope, Hype and Unintended Consequences, ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MEDICINE 796 (2015). 
16. Goldwater Institute Responds to FDA Statement on Right to 
Try, GOLDWATER INST. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://goldwaterinstitute.org/
article/goldwater-institute-responds-to-fda-statement-on-right-to-try/ 
[https://perma.cc/YDP8-Q7WW]. 
17. 5 Reasons for Right to Try, GOLDWATER INST. (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://righttotry.org/5-reasons-for-right-to-try/ 
[https://perma.cc/L9CK-CCVH]. 
18. MARK FLATTEN, Dead on Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves 
Little Hope for Dying Patients, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://righttotry.org/dead-on-arrival/ [https://perma.cc/7VA6-B2BM]. 
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• The FDA compassionate use process doesn’t help enough 
people 
• It takes too long for promising treatments to be approved 
• You shouldn’t have to ask the government for permission to try 
to save your own life19 
 
The above bullet points illustrate both the allusions to a lack of 
access as the problem that is to be fixed by the legislation, as well as 
the assertion, consistent with the Institute’s ideology, that government 
involvement is a hindrance rather than a help. It might be expected, 
given both this and an assumption of nominative determinism in the 
legislation title, that right to try laws would provide both a right to 
patients to try experimental drugs and access to those drugs. Or, in 
other words, right to try laws impose a duty on manufacturers and 
regulators to allow their use. Unfortunately, neither is the case. Rather, 
right to try laws merely provide a set of circumstances where access to 
drugs that have passed phase I clinical trials might be provided. They 
are that: 
 
• Patients must be terminally ill and unable to get to a clinical 
trial 
• The patient’s physician recommends the drug 
• The patient signs informed consent form 
• The manufacturer chooses to provide the drug 
• The patient pays for the drug if the manufacturer chooses to 
charge for it. 
 
And if a patient chooses to access these drugs then: 
 
• The patient may not sue the doctor or drug manufacturer in 
negligence in relation to the decision to provide the drug.20 
 
The assertion of a right is most commonly unfettered, therefore the 
concept of a ‘right to try’ appears at first blush to empower a patient, 
in all circumstances, to access identified drugs or treatment. However, 
it is evident from the above that, rather than enshrining an unfettered 
right to try and therefore access promising treatment, there is much 
that is conditional. The patient may only use the legislation if she is 
terminally ill21rather than, for example, if she feels subjectively that her 
condition is unbearable. The physician acts as a gatekeeper – contrary 
 
19. GOLDWATER INST., supra note 17. 
20. See Dresser, supra note 9; Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan 
McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-
176, S. 204, 115th Cong. (2018). 
21. See 21 C.F.R. 312.81. 
Health Matrix·Volume 31·2021 
Would we be Right to Try “Right to Try”? 
112 
to the tenets of a truly free market as supposedly encouraged by the 
Institute. Meanwhile, the manufacturer may choose whether to provide 
the drug at all, and also whether to charge for it. Therefore, a patient 
who is any one of not terminally ill, lacking the support of her doctor 
or poor will not have a ‘right’ to try anything at all. Even if she is none 
of those things, the ultimate arbiter is the drug manufacturer. There is 
no imperative imposed on manufacturers to provide access to the drug 
and if they choose to provide access, then they may charge as much for 
that access as they wish.22 Also worthy of note is the fact that the 
legislation, hailed as a champion of individual patient rights, serves to 
remove a significant patient right of redress. If the drug is provided 
with the requested treatment, the patient automatically relinquishes 
the right to sue in negligence if they believe that it should not have 
been prescribed to them. Therefore, not only does the law fail to 
enshrine a right to access treatment, it actively diminishes other, well- 
established rights. 
In England and Wales, there was an attempt (from 2014-2016) to 
introduce what was badged as a British version of a right to try.23 Lord 
Saatchi’s ultimately unsuccessful Medical Innovation Bill (MIB) had a 
prominent social media profile, and its Twitter feed on several occasions 
sought to ally itself with its US counterpart by including the hashtag 
‘righttotry’ at the end of tweets.24 However, Lord Saatchi’s Bill was not 
a mere copy of the Goldwater legislation, and had personal tragedy as 
its genesis, 25 Lord Saatchi’s wife died of cancer, and he determined that 
the key barrier to medical innovation (and thus a cure for cancer) was 
a fear of litigation.26 The removal of this fear was thus the only aim of 
the MIB.27 Nevertheless the MIB’s authors, like proponents of right to 
try, sold their proposed legislation on the promise of increased access 
 
22. See FDA FACT SHEET, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/media/133864/download 
[https://perma.cc/HMW2-XATR]. 
23. See Medical Innovation Bill [HL] 2014-2015, UK 
PARLIAMENT, https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2014-
15/medicalinnovation.html [https://perma.cc/3H7G-BXRW] (charting 
the Bill’s progress and amendments). 
24. Miola, supra note 9, at 125; José Miola, Postscript to the Medical 
Innovation Bill: Clearing Up Loose Ends, 11(1) L. INNOVATION & 
TECH. 17, 26 (2019). 
25. Bernadette Richards, Medical innovation laws: an unnecessary 
innovation, 40 AUS. HEALTH REV. 282, 283 (2016). 
26. Maurice Saatchi, Lord Saatchi Bill: We must liberate doctors 




27. Richards, supra note 25, at 285. 
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to experimental drugs and treatments.28 Take, for example, these quotes 
from the MIB’s ‘official media partner’,29 the Daily Telegraph (one of 
England’s best selling broadsheet newspapers): “[the MIB is a] Bill 
which would empower patients and doctors to try out new innovative 
treatments”;30 “[a] new law to allow patients to try untested medicines 
will protect them and nurture medical innovation”;31 “Doctors could be 
allowed to experiment on dying patients with novel treatments under a 
new Bill . . . which looks set to become law”.32 Some other media outlets 
went even further, suggesting explicitly that access would be improved. 
City AM, for example, described the MIB as “[a] Bill proposed by Lord 
Saatchi to give dying cancer patients access to unlicensed drugs”.33 
It may therefore surprise readers to know that the MIB would have 
done nothing of the sort. It would not have been limited to terminally 
ill patients – indeed, it would have applied to any and all conditions 
excluding only those undertaken for a purely cosmetic purpose,34 and 
at no point did it contain any attempt to increase access to drugs and 
treatments.35 Rather, the MIB only ever contained two clauses: one 
relating to a database of innovative treatments and another, which was 
the focus of the Bill, was the exemption from the usual application of 
the law of negligence that legally indemnified a doctor providing an 
 
28. Miola, supra note 9, at 140. 
29. This was revealed in a briefing note to the House of Lords. See MAURICE 
SAATCHI, Medical Innovation Bill: Session 2014-15 Briefing Note 1, 
10 (June 10, 2014), http://medicalinnovationbill.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2014/05/Medical-Innovation-Bill-Briefing-Note-10th-June-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH4N-6HXD]. See Miola, supra note 9, at 
125. 
30. Lord Saatchi Launches the Consultation on his Medical Innovation 
Bill – Live’, DAILY TELEGRAPH (Feb. 24, 2014), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/health/saatchi-bill/10657747/Lord-
Saatchi-launches-the-consultation-on-his-medical-innovation-bill-
live.html [https://perma.cc/CVH6-VGEJ] (emphasis added). 
31. C. HOPE, Leading Doctors Join With Patients to Back Lord Saatchi’s 
Medical Innovation Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH (June 26, 2014) (emphasis 
added) [https://perma.cc/L5DM-LLHK]. 
32. S. KNAPTON, Huge Response to Lord Saatchi’s Medical Innovation 
Bill, DAILY TELEGRAPH (June 1, 2014) (emphasis added) 
[https://perma.cc/5P5X-SVC3]. 
33. Guy Bentley, Government Support for Saatchi Bill Could Mean Dying 




34. Medical Innovation Bill 2015, HL Bill [162] cl. 1(7) (UK). 
35. A reading of the wording of the Bill demonstrates that there is simply no 
clause that provides for this. See Medical Innovation Bill 2014, HC 
Bill [162] (UK). 
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innovative drug or procedure if she followed the process contained in 
the Bill.36 It was therefore framed as a regulatory symbol of hope 
through access to potentially life saving treatment but the focus was on 
the protection of doctors from negligence actions. As with the right to 
try laws, the practical application of the proposed law was in fact a 
limitation of a well-established and clearly framed protection under the 
guise of enhancing individual access to unproven treatment. 
Right to try laws and the MIB seek to address the same apparent 
problem37 but come from very different starting points. For Lord 
Saatchi, the tragic death of his wife from cancer made him determined 
to loosen what he saw as the shackles that fear of the law put on 
doctors.38 Meanwhile, the Goldwater Institute’s starting point was a 
view that limited government was to be encouraged, and that it is the 
right of individuals rather than government to determine what 
treatments they should be able to access.39 Moreover, the substance of 
the two pieces of legislation are different, with right to try concentrating 
on the qualifying conditions for access, and the MIB on the law of 
negligence. Yet, despite this, they share two things in common: first, 
both ask the patient to engage in a bargain that swaps (theoretical) 
access to experimental drugs for the legal protection of appropriate 
provision of treatment and oversight of the doctor’s duty of care to look 
after the best interests of the patient. Second, both right to try and the 
MIB seek to appoint apparent informed consent as the primary 
mechanism for protecting patient safety – something that we will argue 
is particularly problematic, not least given the discrepancy between 
how both pieces of legislation were sold and what they actually provide. 
It is to these two issues that we now turn. 
II. The ‘Bargain’ 
It is curious that laws built on the rhetoric of ‘patient rights’ have, 
as a foundational requirement, the relinquishment of a well-established 
legal protection. Both right to try laws and the MIB seek to entice the 
patient into a bargain: in return for access to the experimental 
 
36. See Miola, supra note 24, at 19 (discussing the inclusion of a database for 
innovative treatments); Miola, supra note 9, at 128 (noting that the Bill 
was designed to protect doctors’ “responsible innovation” from 
negligence). 






38. See Saatchi, supra note 26. 
39. See, e.g., GOLDWATER INST., supra note 16. 
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treatment, they must agree to forego the right to seek legal redress in 
relation to the decision to provide the drug.40 The rationale behind this 
bargain is not difficult to explain. For advocates of right to try, the 
mantra of individual choice and personal responsibility makes such a 
deal attractive – ‘you pays your money, you takes your choice’.41 
Meanwhile, for Lord Saatchi the entire point of the MIB was the 
removal of the fear of litigation from doctors in order to encourage them 
to innovate. It is therefore inevitable that the ability of the patient to 
seek civil redress for harm caused by inappropriate or careless treatment 
would have to be compromised or removed entirely in certain 
circumstances, as without the removal of the right to sue the fear of 
litigation would persist. There is no ability to interrogate or challenge 
the advice given by the treating doctor in the identification of the 
unproven treatment or support of the patient in seeking that treatment. 
This leaves open potentially unprofessional conduct, questions of 
conflict of interest or simply careless treatment. 
This bargain is, of course, presented as a part of a package that is, 
ultimately, of benefit to the patient, consistent with the presentation of 
both pieces of legislation as enhancing patients’ rights and ability to 
access experimental drugs and treatments. The wall of protection 
thrown up around the treatment team is underplayed, if not completely 
ignored. The purported value to patients of this bargain is predicated 
upon the promises of access to drugs and treatments that would 
otherwise be unavailable. But these promises are not met by the Bills 
themselves which, on the most generous interpretation, offer little more 
than a right to ask for access to a drug or treatment, so long as certain 
pre-requisites are met. This therefore falls short of an unfettered right 
of access. Indeed the ‘rights’ based laws offer no new right, there is no 
obligation imposed on drug manufacturers to provide the drug, on 
doctors to make the patient aware of the drugs, or on insurance 
companies to provide insurance for the use of these drugs. On that 
basis, we are compelled to ask: are these are actually good or bad 
bargains? Or, to put it another way, does the harm of foregoing the 
benefit of post hoc protection balance out against the benefit of the 
ability to seek access to drugs or treatments that are unproven, could 
cause further harm and are uninsured. The benefits to the patient are 
difficult to identify; not only is the access to the drugs only a potential 
access, the benefit of the drugs themselves is, at best, a potential benefit, 
sitting alongside potential harm. The patient is granted nothing more 
 
40. It should be noted that this does not extend to the administration of the 
medication. If, for example, the wrong dosage was given or it was injected 
in the wrong place then the patient would still be able to sue. See Bolam 
v. Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1WLR 583 (U.K.). 
41. Taken from Aldous Huxley’s foreword to the 1946 edition of Brave New 
World; see H. Bloom, BLOOM’S MODERN CRITICAL VIEWS: ALDOUS 
HUXLEY 100 (Infobase Publishing, 2010). 
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than a roll of the dice. Framed in this way, it looks to be a very poor 
bargain indeed. 
This assertion becomes clearer when we consider the specific 
provisions, and practical application of the two regimes under 
consideration here. Turning first to the right to try movement. It will 
be remembered that it sells itself as an antidote to an FDA process that 
is apparently onerous, slow, and does not help enough people.42 The 
strong implication is that right to try would solve these problems. 
However, comparing the FDA regime to right to try does not make it 
evident how right to try would actually help. First, right to try promises 
access to drugs that have passed phase I clinical trials,43 while the FDA 
compassionate use program allows access to drugs before they have 
passed Phase I – an earlier point in the process.44 Secondly, the 
implication that the FDA is denying access to drugs is not supported 
by the facts. As the FDA themselves report, their compassionate use 
program has approved 99% of requests.45 The 2018 Program Report was 
the result of an independent assessment with the “key goals” to “better 
understand the expanded access program’s performance and identify 
ways to improve it.”46 
Whilst this serves as an acknowledgement that the program could 
be improved, it also shows that what is not lacking is will on the part 
of the FDA, and that it will continue to be receptive to reform of its 
program rather than its marginalization. Significantly, the focus of the 
FDA program is to “ensure patients continue to receive timely and 
medically appropriate access to investigational medical products 
through the EA program” and to balance the input of the wide variety 
of stakeholders (including healthcare providers, patients, drug and 
 
42. See Lynch et al., supra note 5. 






44. Dresser, supra note 9. 
45. Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb M.D. on New Efforts 
to Strengthen FDA’s Expanded Access Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN. (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm625397.htm [https://perma.cc/QT
Y2-KAQJ]. See also Expanded Access Program Report 2018, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN. 1, 2 (May 2018), https://www.fda.gov/
media/119971/download (covering an independent assessment of the 
scheme which reported that over a 5-year period approximately 9,000 
applications were processed with an approval rate of 99%) 
[https://perma.cc/3WA3-TAUA]. 
46. Expanded Access Program Report 2018, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. 1, 2 
(May 2018). 
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device manufacturers).47 The FDA is demonstrating a wider focus than 
that of the crafters of the right to try laws who have created an unequal 
bargain. An important participant in the right to try bargain is the 
drug manufacturing industry, and whilst it is not something that the 
authors of right to try can be blamed for as they will not have known 
in advance, there is a significant gap in their proposed bargain. The 
legislated bargain relies on the support of drug manufacturers; indeed, 
a successful bargain relies on the manufacturers coming to the table, 
but as yet, they have failed to do so. This was clearly explained by a 
representative of Merck and Co in the following terms: “While well 
intentioned, current ‘Right to Try’ legislation is not in the best interests 
of patients and is unlikely to help us bring forward innovative, safe and 
effective medicines to all patients as quickly as possible.”48 
They are not alone, with some citing a fear that allowing their 
products to be used in right to try requests may hinder attempts to 
obtain full FDA funding.49 It is also of note that patient groups have 
not supported the passage of the law. For example, Folkers et al. 
reported that over eighty patient groups signed on to various letters to 
members of Congress asking them to oppose right to try, whilst only 
seventeen groups signed a letter addressed to the Senate on August 2, 
2017, to encourage passage of a federal bill.50 
The bargain offered by right to try cannot be said to be a good one, 
and in some respects the law is best described as aspirational. It 
empowers drug companies to make drugs available but there is no 
mandate, and, as we have seen, the companies have expressed 
reservations about the law.51 The most notable failing of the bargain is 
that the benefit offered is illusory: the law does not seem to offer any 
appreciable advantages over the FDA program and, crucially, it 
removes a significant right of redress from patients, as the FDA 
program does not entail the loss of the right to sue while right to try 
legislation does. In other words, despite the rights-based rhetoric, using 
right to try rather than the FDA program would give patients fewer 
rights rather than more, for no appreciable increase in their chances of 
access. 
Lord Saatchi’s MIB would have fared equally badly. The driving 
force behind the Bill – and the only factor identified as a barrier to 
doctors innovating – was doctors’ apparent fear of the law of negligence. 
 
47. Id. at 3. 
48. Shannon Firth, Will “Right to Try” Bill Actually Help Anyone?, MED. 
PG. TODAY (Aug. 11, 2017), https://www.medpagetoday.com/
publichealthpolicy/fdageneral/67222 [https://perma.cc/2H5Q-GJ35]. 
49. Id. 
50. Folkers et al., Federal Right to Try: Where is it Going?, 49(2) HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 26, 30 (2019). 
51. Firth, supra note 48. 
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The MIB’s bargain therefore swapped the patient’s right to sue in 
negligence (hence removing the fear from doctors) for the promised 
access to unidentified drugs and treatments, or at the very least a 
change in culture that would encourage such access to be granted. Yet 
the very premise that doctors were prevented from innovating due to a 
fear of litigation was an assumption that was not supported by the 
evidence.52 When the Department of Health issued its consultation on 
the MIB, it asked whether it was the experience of respondees that 
innovation was being stifled by a fear of litigation.53 The responses were 
chastening for supporters of Lord Saatchi’s Bill, as only one small 
organization responded that there was such a fear.54 Against this, all of 
the key stakeholders responded that no such fear existed. As one of us 
has previously noted: 
In other words, neither the doctors’ trade union (the BMA), or 
either of the medical defence bodies (MDU and MPS), who 
doctors might be expected to consult first if worried about 
litigation, found any evidence of a fear of litigation deterring 
innovative treatment nor has the NHS body that would deal with 
such claims if they were to arise (the NHSLA). As demonstrated 
above, neither did the research bodies such as Cancer Research 
UK and the Association of Medical Research Charities.55 
Also coming out in opposition were the GMC,56 the medical 
regulator in the UK,57 and the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers.58 
The MIB therefore managed to achieve something rare: it united 
doctors (medical defense bodies), lawyers (both claimant - and defense 
- focused), and research charities; but not in the way that its authors 
would have hoped. Patients were being asked to waive their right to 
sue in negligence in return for the promised removal of a fear that none 
of the key stakeholders agreed was there in the first place. And the 
 
52. See Miola, supra note 9, at 131–32. 
53. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, REPORT ON THE CONSULTATION ON THE 
MEDICAL INNOVATION BILL (2014). 
54. The organization was BASO-ACS (British Association of Surgical   
Oncologists – Association for Cancer Surgery). See DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH, REPORT ON THE CONSULTATION ON THE MEDICAL INNOVATION 
BILL 11 (2014). 
55. Miola, supra note 9, at 132. 
56. Id. at 136 (noting that the GMC referred to the Bill as “unnecessary and 
undesirable”). 
57. See generally Medical Act 1983, c. 54 (UK). 
58. Medical Innovation Bill Threatens to ”Erode Patient Safety,” APIL 
(Apr. 25, 2014), https://www.apil.org.uk/press-release/Medical-
Innovation-Bill-threatens-to-erode-patient-safety 
[https://perma.cc/6PUJ-SU9E]. 
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identified benefit? Potential access to potential treatment that was 
unproven and unsupported. A poor bargain indeed. 
Let us be very clear about right to try laws and the MIB: they do 
not succeed, even on their own terms, if their purpose is to provide 
enhanced rights for patients. Neither provides access to any drugs or 
devices that doctors could not otherwise use (the MIB makes no 
mention of access, and right to try laws promise access at a point later 
than the FDA expanded use program) Neither allows a medical 
practitioner to do anything that she could not otherwise do. Finally, 
and perhaps crucially, neither provides any funding – something that 
was identified as a barrier to providing innovative treatments – that 
was not there before.59 Moreover, they are specifically sold on a false 
promise of increased access to drugs and treatments that they cannot 
deliver. 
For these reasons, the bargains that they invite patients to engage 
in are to all intents and purposes bogus. They are based on illusory 
benefits that come at an unacceptable cost. In the case of right to try, 
patients are asked to forego their right to sue in return for a program 
that is less advantageous than the existing one. The access to drugs is 
later than the FDA program would allow, has a less protective system 
of oversight and would struggle to meet the 99% approval rate of the 
existing program.60 Equally, the MIB asks patients to swap their right 
to sue in return for the removal of a fear of litigation that there is little 
indication exists (and, where it does, could be mitigated by better 
education for doctors rather than a removal of the rights of patients). 
Patients, who are told that these laws would add to their rights, would 
actually see them eroded for no good reason. 
But there is one way in which this approach does make sense. If we 
recategorize patients as “consumers exercising choices,”61 and tell them 
that “adults who are capable of understanding that medical treatment 
is uncertain of success and may involve risks, accepting responsibility 
for the taking of risks affecting their own lives, and living with the 
consequences of their choices,”62 we can ask them to trade the control 
for responsibility. The natural quid pro quo to making one’s own 
decisions is that the decision-maker has both ownership of the decision 
and responsibility for its consequences. Readers with a background in 
English medical law will recognize the above quotes as coming from the 
landmark UK Supreme Court case of Montgomery. v Lanarkshire 
 
59. See Miola, supra note 9, at 128. 
60. See Expanded Access (Compassionate Use) Submission Data, U.S. FOOD 
& DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/news-events/expanded-access/
expanded-access-compassionate-use-submission-data 
[https://perma.cc/L8XN-65WY]. 
61. Montgomery UKSC 11, at [75] (quoting Lord Kerr and Lord Reed). 
62. Id. at [81] (emphasis added). 
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Health Board.63 This was a case about informed consent, and it is no 
surprise that another aspect of what right to try and the MIB seek to 
do is to replace negligence with informed consent as the mechanism for 
patient protection. The latter is far more in keeping with a view of 
patients as making and owning their own decisions in a market – 
certainly consistent with the Goldwater Institute’s view of the world; 
and equally so with Lord Saatchi’s vision of patients making their own 
choices and allowing innovating doctors the freedom to thrive without 
fear of legal censure. 
All of this, of course, begs the question of whether informed consent 
is up to the task that it is has been set by these laws. We consider this 
later in this paper, but before that we focus on some other problems 
inherent in their approach. 
III. So What’s the Problem 
The introduction of new drugs and devices into standard care 
occurs within a carefully constructed, protective framework.64 This is 
usually through clinical trials, where there is a framework that balances 
a breadth of interests and has as its foundational principle protection 
of the vulnerable patient and support for responsible clinical 
innovation.65 This requires a high level of regulation but the regulation 
is not, as some would assert, driven by market forces.66 Rather it has 
as its primary purpose protection of both the public health system and 
individual patient health care and both of these, of necessity, involves 
control over access to drugs and treatment until they are deemed safe.67 
This crucial characteristic of the regulatory scheme was highlighted in 
the US in the Abigail Alliance decision, when the Court drew attention 
to the fact that the rights based arguments overlook the significant 
 
63. Id. 
64. This is overseen by the FDA in the US and the Medicines and Healthcare 
Products Regulatory Industry (MHRA) in the UK and the Therapeutic 
Goods Administration (TGA) in Australia. See SHWETA HANDOO ET 
AL., A comprehensive study on regulatory requirements for development 
and filing of generic drugs globally, INT. J. PHARM. INVESTIG. 2(3):99-105 
(2012). 
65. In the UK, there is a new regularly framework starting in 2021, replacing 
the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004. Bukky Balogun, Elizabeth Rough & Sarah Barber, Research 
Briefing: Medicines and Medical Devices Bill 2019-21, HOUSE OF 
COMMONS LIBRARY (Jan. 27, 2021), https://commonslibrary.
parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8699/ [https://perma.cc/WCW9-
X6MN]. 
66. See, e.g., Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. 
Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
67. See generally HAZEL BIGGS, HEALTHCARE RESEARCH ETHICS AND LAW 5-
15 (Abingdon, Cavendish, 2010). 
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‘history of regulating the safety of drugs’ and suggested that the focus 
on accessibility and effectiveness of particular forms of treatment 
‘ignores one simple fact: it is unlawful for the Alliance to procure 
experimental drugs not only because they have not been proven 
effective, but because they have not been proven safe’.68 
As a background note, the Abigail Alliance, like the MIB, grew out 
of personal tragedy, Abigail Burroughs suffered from neck cancer and 
was ineligible to enter a clinical trial, the Alliance was formed and her 
case brought to court. The Alliance challenged the established clinical 
trial framework and argued for more expanded access on the basis that 
the existing process was “inadequate to meet the needs of its terminally 
ill patients.”69 The Alliance also argued that they had a constitutional 
right of autonomy and self-defense where the Alliance asserted inter 
alia that the control exercised by the FDA and other regulators was 
driven by market imperatives and was not about protection of patients. 
The court ultimately rejected this argument. The introduction of the 
right to try laws and the MIB echoes the arguments raised by the 
Abigail Alliance (and ultimately rejected by the court), and represents 
a significant shift in the nature of the dialogue with the focus on an 
assertion of individual rights as opposed to collective interests. It cannot 
be denied that the motivation behind this regulatory initiative is 
positive, since it is about supporting individuals suffering from terrible 
diseases who feel disempowered by their poor health. But asserting a 
right to try unproven drugs and overriding the protective framework 
without careful review of either efficacy or safety, (as is provided by the 
expanded access program), is exposing those patients to unnecessary 
risk of further harm.70 The rights-based dialogue has gained traction 
because of a natural sympathy for those who are unwell, and a 
perception that everything can be cured.71 This is a poor foundation for 
major legal review as it represents a misconception, as a right to try 
experimental drugs or treatments will not automatically lead to good 
health. Unfortunately, the belief in the efficacy of these drugs is, at 
best, overly optimistic and at worst, dangerously naïve.72 
The narrative behind the introduction of these laws appeals to 
public sympathy and employs emotive language. When Lord Saatchi 
introduced the MIB he did not engage with clinical benefits or broader 
public health interests. Rather, he relied on dark tales of cancer sufferers 
 
68. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 703. 
69. Id. at 699. 
70. This was the crux of the opposition to Lord Saatchi’s Medical Innovation 
Bill in the UK. In a letter of opposition, the Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges warned that people could “risk untested treatments.” Miola, 
supra note 24, at 24. 
71. Dresser, supra note 9. 
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living through scenes “that would not be permitted in a Hollywood 
horror movie”73 and the description of those “condemned [to death] by 
cancer” as suffering “a worse fate than the worst mass murderer[s], 
[w]hile they await execution, they are tortured.”74 And the Right to Try 
laws are built on stories of tragedy and ‘avoidable’ death. The right to 
try website has headline photos of children and teenagers who have had 
to leave the country to gain access to potentially life saving treatment 
or are fighting to save their own lives with the assistance of right to try 
laws.75 Under the heading ‘Why we Needed Right to Try’ is the 
publication ‘Dead on Arrival’ which, amongst other things, tells the 
incredibly sad tale of Nick Auden, a 41-year-old who died in 2013 after 
trying unsuccessfully to enroll in clinical trials and access drugs under 
the expanded access scheme.76 His story is undeniably a tragic one, but 
the center piece of the narrative is the refusal by Merck and Bristol-
Myers Squibb to support his expanded access application, the 
implication being that right to try laws would have enabled access and 
potentially saved his life.77 However, this is misleading because, as we 
have seen in the preceding discussion, the law does not impose a duty 
on companies to provide access to their drugs, and Merck 
representatives have not been supportive of the laws and argue that 
they fail to protect the best interests of the patients.78 Given this, it is 
wrong to assert that right to try would have helped that patient. 
The starting point of the introduction of right to try laws can 
therefore be seen as well-intentioned but misguided. There are two 
other potential problems with these laws which are worth considering. 
The first is that they fail in their primary goal, which is to protect the 
patient, and the second is the potential negative effect on the ongoing 
development of promising drugs -through the slowing down of clinical 
trials and negative market impacts on companies developing a drug. 
Each of these additional concerns will be addressed in turn. 
IV. Fails in Primary Goal: Protection of the Patient 
(The (In)Adequacy of Informed Consent) 
As mentioned above, the right to try narrative rests firmly on 
patient rights and an apparent protection of their interests, but it does 
 
73. 742 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2013) col. 757 (UK). 
74. 754 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2014) col. 1450 (UK). 
75. See righttotry, GOLDWATER INST., http://righttotry.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/XGF6-GWEY]. 
76. Dead On Arrival: Federal “Compassionate Use” Leaves Little Hope for 
Dying Patients, GOLDWATER INST. (Feb. 24, 2016), http://righttotry.org/
dead-on-arrival/ [https://perma.cc/VL44-A6CG]. 
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this through a removal of the foundational right to bring an action in 
negligence.79 The authors of the law might argue that this does not 
reduce the overall protection of patients as it replaces this right, which 
otherwise undermines the doctor-patient relationship, with other 
protections.80 A common feature of right to try laws and the MIB is 
this replacement of negligence (reviewing the doctor’s decision) with 
informed consent (executing the patient’s wishes) as the primary 
mechanism for protecting patient safety. However, changing the focus 
in this way fails to appropriately protect the patient as it overlooks the 
unequal nature of the doctor-patient relationship, the vulnerability of 
the patient, and the potential for interests other than those of the 
patient to insert themselves into the decision taken by the patient and 
doctor to proceed with the provision of innovative treatment. In short, 
whilst informed consent is an important patient right, it cannot 
adequately protect the patient in these highly complex situations. 
Before we consider this in more depth, it is worth restating that current 
English law on informed consent, as determined by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Montgomery, is very much consistent with the ‘patient 
choice’ ethos inherent in right to try and the MIB.81 As we note above, 
the Supreme Court spoke of patients as “consumers exercising 
choices.”82 It is also worth quoting more fully the other declaration of 
intent that we noted above as it gives a flavor of the philosophy of the 
law as seen by the judges: 
[S]ocial and legal developments . . . point away from a model of 
the relationship between the doctor and the patient based upon 
medical paternalism. They also point away from a model based 
upon a view of the patient as being entirely dependent on 
information provided by the doctor. What they point towards is 
an approach to the law which, instead of treating patients as 
placing themselves in the hands of their doctors (and then being 
prone to sue their doctors in the event of a disappointing 
outcome), treats them so far as possible as adults who are capable 
of understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of success 
and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of 
 
79. See Lynch et al., supra note 5. 
80. Indeed, Lord Saatchi has argued that the MIB would both protect 
patients and encourage innovation. Doctors need more freedom to 
innovate, say Peers, Democracy Live, BBC NEWS (June 27, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/house-of-commons-28055648 
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risks affecting their own lives, and living with the consequences of 
their choices.83 
Of course, this only functions properly if the law is able to protect 
patients to make such choices meaningful and based on the information 
that they need. In this section, we argue that informed consent is not 
able to achieve this itself, and that it leaves patients exposed to ‘bad 
actors.’84 Indeed, when we say that we want to encourage innovation, 
what we really mean is that we want to encourage responsible 
innovation while simultaneously discouraging irresponsible innovation. 
It is worth noting here that the language we are using is the same as 
the original MIB with s1(1) providing that ‘The purpose of this Act is 
to encourage responsible innovation,’ the key point of differentiation 
being that we do not agree with the underlying premise of how this is 
to be achieved. We agree that the critical distinction between 
responsible and irresponsible innovation should be supported by the law 
and requires a level of regulatory oversight, but informed consent is not 
a sufficiently sharp tool for making this distinction. This is for several 
reasons. 
To begin with, it is almost trite to say that informed consent 
depends on information.85 The doctor must provide the patient with 
sufficient relevant information for her to make an autonomous 
decision.86 But this means that the patient’s decision will depend at 
least in part on what information is given, and how it is presented. A 
doctor who is an enthusiastic adopter or supporter of a specific 
innovation can easily become, intentionally or unintentionally, an 
advocate for it.87 When asked by the patient whether they would take 
the offered treatment the doctor will often provide answers in the 
affirmative, and this, along with their general support for the treatment, 
will go some way to persuading or reassuring the patient that the 
treatment is worthwhile.88 While this can, in theory, be addressed by 
the law, there is little in the cases that relates to tone, and Montgomery 
 
83. Id. at [81] (emphasis added). 
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involved in the mechanics of communication see Al Hamwi v. Johnson & 
Another, EWHC 206 (2005) (critiqued in J. MIOLA, Autonomy Rules 
OK?, 14(1) MED. L. REV. 108 (2006)). 
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itself is noticeably vague on the issue of the mechanics of 
communication.89 Yet this might well be absolutely crucial, as there are 
two other factors in relation to these patients that makes them more 
than usually vulnerable to such persuasion. 
The first is that these are patients whose very position will mean 
that they may well need little persuading.90 To qualify for right to try, 
patients must be terminally ill, while the MIB was (erroneously) 
advertised as relating most specifically for patients with rare cancers.91 
Put bluntly, the idea is that these are patients for whom there is no 
other hope: the standard treatment will be or have been ineffective, and 
the experimental treatment is therefore the only hope that they have 
left.92 They are likely to be extremely receptive to any suggestion that 
offers the chance of a cure, alleviation of symptoms or at least a slowing 
down of the progress of their disease.93 They will not hear the absence 
of proof, rather they will focus solely on the unsubstantiated promise of 
hope. 
This is exacerbated by the second factor: the way in which the 
debate surrounding right to try laws are framed so that the discourse 
emphasizes good outcomes while minimizing the risk of adverse 
outcomes.94 Rebecca Dresser has examined this in the context of right 
to try in the US, and found this to be the case.95 As she notes, sometimes 
data surrounding success rates can become drowned out by anecdotes 
and distressing stories: 
In defense of access oversight, scientists, FDA officials, and policy 
experts cite data on investigational-drug risks and low success 
rates, as well as the need for a rigorous drug-evaluation system. 
But in the access debate, data and abstract policy considerations 
go only so far. Access advocates use a different strategy, one that 
highlights individual patients’ stories. To support their cause, 
access advocates offer heartrending accounts of terminally ill 
patients seeking investigational drugs and deceased patients who 
 
89. Heywood & Miola, supra note 6. 
90. Dresser, supra note 9. 
91. Miola, supra note 24, at 24. 
92. As noted above, the narrative constructed by both Right to Try and the 
MIB is based on such cases. 
93. See D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A 
Proposal for Heightened Safeguards, 15(2) J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. 
& POL’Y 479, 503 (1999). 
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at the phase I trial stage of development. See Dresser, supra note 9, at 
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were denied such drugs. These stories strongly influence 
legislative and public opinion on the access question.96 
Dresser goes on to demonstrate how advocates of right to try laws 
used such stories to emphasize the ‘need’ for the legislation.97 In the 
UK, supporters of the MIB did the same.98 However, Dresser also 
demonstrates that both doctors and non-doctors can be incredibly 
optimistic about how likely experimental drugs are to work, and that 
the voices of those who have had adverse reactions to experimental 
drugs are “drowned out.”99 In other words, the discourse surrounding 
the provision of experimental drugs distorts rather than clarifies the 
true situation. Patients are encouraged by advocates of such laws to 
overestimate the chances of success, and the voices of those whose 
quality of life has been made worse, or who have died horrendous deaths 
or had their lives shortened rather than lengthened are marginalized or 
silenced in our clamor to believe in the positive.100 Patients are 
encouraged to believe that a drug in a phase I clinical trial is tomorrow’s 
treatment today, rather than the reality, which is that it is far more 
likely not to be found safe and/or effective than it is to ever be 
licensed.101 This leads directly to the next identified concern which is 
the negative impact that premature access to unproven treatments can 
have on well-established development regimes. 
V. Undermining Medical Advancement 
The current process of bringing drugs into the clinical setting is a 
carefully constructed clinical trial regime and involves staged and 
closely monitored testing of the unproven drug.102 It is not a speedy 
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98. See, e.g., Laura Milne, Mum pleads for law to be changed to save her 
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100. Id. at 1654–55. 
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102. For an example from Australia, see Australian clinical trial 
handbook¸ AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF HEALTH: THERAPEUTIC GOODS 
ADMIN. 42 (Nov. 2020), https://www.tga.gov.au/sites/default/files/aust
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Step 3: Clinical Research, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
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process but is designed to minimize risk with a focus on balancing the 
interests of participants in the trial, those who are currently suffering 
from the targeted illness, those who will suffer from it in the future and 
broad public health considerations.103 It is a complex equation that 
simply cannot please everyone or meet all identified needs but it is best 
characterized as an appropriately protective regime.104 Clinical trials 
often have restricted enrolment requirements and do not guarantee 
access to trial drugs with the design often involving a placebo arm.105 
Therefore, if an apparently promising form of treatment is made 
available outside of the clinical trial framework it will be a preferable 
path for those who focus on the hope provided by access to the new 
regime (as opposed to the exposure to risk) and they will opt for this 
path as opposed to the clinical trial one. 
An example of how this can harm both patients and the clinical 
trial process overall can be found in the cautionary tale of access to 
aHSCT-HDIT (autologous hematopoietic stem cell transplant) 
treatment for breast cancer in the 1980s and 90s in the United States. 
The facts here are fairly straightforward (and are drawn from the 
detailed account provided by Rettig et al, 2007.)106 The treatment 
emerged in the late 1980s and was ‘catapulted’ into widespread use 
before careful evaluation. Insurers characterized the treatment as 
experimental and declined to provide coverage, in response to this a 
number of enterprising patients and physicians then took the insurers 
 
in human medicines, EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, 
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to court arguing that the treatment was not experimental and sought 
a court order that the appropriate cover be provided.107 
Rettig et al reported that there were 75 unique reported cases and 
one clear factor prevails; sympathy for these critically ill patients. A 
review of some of the legal decisions reveals that it was often this 
sympathy that swayed the decision- making and there was an urge to 
save patients.108 It then became a self- perpetuating situation with the 
courts being persuaded by the apparent widespread adoption of the 
treatment being used as evidence of its acceptance and efficacy.109 It 
took on the character of a self-fulfilling prophecy, but there was a 
complete absence of scientific evidence and support. The prophecy was 
false. But the widespread patient advocacy combined with the dire 
health of the applicants swayed the courts, despite scientific and 
medical challenges to the efficacy of the treatment.110 During this time 
the relevant clinical trials were suffering with patients declining to 
enroll in the trial because the treatment was otherwise widely 
available.111 Ultimately the trials were completed and they universally 
demonstrated that the treatment did not result in an increased chance 
of survival.112 The only trial that had demonstrated a benefit was 
subsequently audited and found to be fraudulent.113 
An in-depth examination of this story is well beyond the scope of 
this paper (and is provided elsewhere114), however it is worth noting as 
it presents a cautionary tale of widespread access without full and 
thorough research. Vulnerable patients bought into what proved to be 
false hope and energies that could have been directed in a more 
beneficial manner were focused on flawed treatment. Moreover, given 
the perception that the treatment offered hope, many patients were 
drawn to it and declined to participate in the established trial which 
meant that the trial process was slowed, those patients were all acting 
on perception of hope as opposed to evidence based treatment and 
positive harm was suffered by some vulnerable patients.115 
A further cautionary tale can be found in premature access to an 
undeveloped drug in response to a potential global pandemic. An 
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example was provided by Dresser116 and Bateman- House117 in 
consideration of the response to the Ebola crisis. Both explained that 
the negative publicity surrounding early access to a developing 
treatment could cause a drug company to cease development and 
withdraw it from the trial process, thus limiting future development.118 
The drug discussed by Bateman-House was the experimental drug 
Brincidofovir which was administered to Thomas Duncan who was 
suffering from Ebola.119 Unfortunately, either the drug did not work or 
he was too far progressed with his illness but he died and there was 
significant backlash against the company, and a subsequent drop in the 
stock price.120 The company withstood the financial threat but 
Bateman- House raised the question of what would have happened if 
the negative impact had caused the company to fail.121 A promising 
drug would have ceased its development and the potential for broader 
benefit lost. 
A more generalized argument about the wider implications of right 
to try laws was made during the debate surrounding the MIB in the 
UK by medical research charities. This is that, where there are rare 
diseases, patients opting for treatment under the ‘innovative treatment’ 
pathway instead of joining a trial may make such trials unviable due 
to a lack of participants.122 It should be noted at this point that this 
criticism applies specifically to the MIB, as qualification for the US 
Right to Try laws is dependent on it not being possible to join a clinical 
trial.123 There was no such protection of trial viability in the MIB. This 
is perhaps surprising, as the Goldwater Institute’s philosophy of the 
focus on the individual and freedom from state interference might be 
thought to preclude a duty to help the collective rather than oneself – 
which is ultimately what a clinical trial does. In other words, we should 
be clear that, at least in the British version of the law, there would be 
potential negative effects on the ability of researchers to recruit 
sufficient participants for clinical trials to be run in relation to rare 
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diseases. Tragically, the more rare the disease the more likely it is that 
this might come to pass and the lack of sufferers will already make it 
difficult to recruit for a trial, which ironically pushes patients towards 
‘innovative treatment’ rather than a trial. 
But we should also be clear about the corollary of this, as argued 
above. What we and the research charities are implicitly acknowledging 
is that we support encouraging patients to participate in trials rather 
than receive the more direct benefit of innovative treatment as a patient 
rather than a research participant. We should also be honest and admit 
that this would ask the patient to do something that is potentially not 
in their interests. This is for two reasons. First, in the trial the 
participant may be placed in the control group, if there is one. Second, 
the purpose of treatment as a patient is to directly benefit the patient. 
In a clinical trial, the purpose is instead to gather information.124 A 
benefit to the participants may accrue, but it is not the primary aim, 
which is to gather data – although of course the clinical trials framework 
requires that patients are not harmed, and if their condition deteriorates 
they will be removed from the trial and treated.125 Moreover, researchers 
are of course actively looking and hoping for improvement in the 
patient’s condition.126 That is not to say that innovative treatments will 
necessarily be better, and the reality is that outcomes will not always 
be positive– as Keren-Paz notes, there is often a lag between innovative 
treatments being tried to their being perfected, so one should prefer not 
to be among the first patients to receive them.127 Nevertheless, at least 
the aim and intention would be to treat the patient, which is not the 
case in a clinical trial. This may be little more than a symbolic 
difference in almost all cases, since as mentioned above the hope with 
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a trial is that the participant’s condition will improve, but with 
innovative treatment the focus is solely on the patient, and there is no 
trial framework or wider aim to cause tensions. 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the right to try narrative (both in relation to 
the US’s right to try laws and the MIB in the UK), fail to stand up to 
scrutiny. The claims made regarding access do not match the reality, 
and the bargain that patients are asked to engage in is deeply flawed. 
Patients are asked to forgo a well-established right to seek legal redress 
in the form of negligence, but gain little more than potential in return. 
This does not mean that we perceive negligence law to be faultless, but 
what we do demand is that any system that is proposed for replacing 
it should be shown to be better, and in neither right to try legislation 
nor the MIB can this been said to be the case. We have also identified 
that the notion of shifting the law’s patient protection mechanism from 
negligence to informed consent is ineffective and can only result in a 
watering down of the law’s ability to respond adequately to 
irresponsible innovation. If the crux of the law should be the 
encouragement of responsible innovation combined with the 
discouragement of irresponsible innovation, then these laws can be seen 
to fail on both counts. 
Indeed, a further, unintended consequence of the removal of the 
ability of injured patients to sue in negligence is that the law’s role as 
a deterrent to bad actors is compromised. Medical practitioners who 
are either ‘snake oil salesmen’ or, perhaps even more concerningly, too 
inexperienced or insufficiently skilled to see the flaws in their thinking 
also gain immunity from being sued. 
We have also demonstrated that such laws contain other dangers, 
from the threat to the viability of clinical trials in rare diseases, to the 
aHSCT-HDIT example, where an ineffective treatment became widely 
available. Patients do not gain anything from such treatments, and lose 
the opportunity to try something else that might work. We are all 
agreed that there must be some method of allowing accelerated access 
to innovative drugs and treatments for patients who have no other 
hope, indeed regulatory bodies actively encourage and support such 
access. However, right to try laws are clearly not the best way and serve 
to undermine existing pathways. We suspect that the real answer may 
be more mundane: there is little evidence that either the FDA scheme 
in the US or the accelerated access schemes in the UK suffer from a 
lack of desire to make drugs available. It may well be that with better 
funding more patients can be helped. Yet whether or not that is the 
case, the removal of the right to sue in negligence in return for no 
greater access than afforded by these schemes (as is the reality of right 
to try laws and the MIB, rather than the narrative) not only takes us 
no further forward, but is likely to make matters worse. A final 
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cautionary note to sound is that the naming of these schemes is actively 
misleading. Neither of the regulatory frameworks presents a meaningful 
right to try anything. They both stop well short of empowering 
patients, and the ‘bargains’ that they seek to strike with patients can 
only be described as bad. 
 
